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ABSTRACT. The changes that took place after 1989 in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe 
were political, social and economic. They were especially combined with the economic 
transformation. Due to the lack of comparable transformation experiences, the governments 
and societies of the countires that took up the “challenge” of transformation were left on their 
own to organise their own programmes and activities.  
The aim of this study is to analyse and evaluate the economic transformation, with particular 
focus on three areas: the initial conditions, the progress, the results. At the same time, the 
fundamental hypothesis of this study is that from the very beginning od the systemic changes in 
the transitional economies there was a strong correlation between the actual changes and the 
scale and intensity of changes in the economy.  
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Introduction  
The changes that took place after 1989 in the countires of Central-Eastern Europe and in the 
countires that were part of the USSR, were at the same time political, special and economic.  
The changes involved especially economic transformation, however, further in this study we 
present the transition as the total and radical transformation of goals, principles and operating 
conditions of all economic entities, including the state itself. The transformation was not a limited 
(or partial) attempt at reforming the previously existing system of centrally governed authoritarian 
economy. It was an effort to create a system bearing the characteristics of a democratic market 
economy. While there was social awareness of the need and necessity to effect such a ground-
breaking and quality systemic change – both among the political and economic elits and the 
common members of the societies – what remained vague was not only the particular variant or 
model of the developed market-oriented economy to be achieved, but also – which was even more 
important – the method of effecting the systemic transition and economic changes in particular, as 
well as the scope, pace of the changes, etc.  
In the face of the lack of described and historically comparable transitional experiences of other 
countires and in the light of the scale of changes, the governments and societies of the countries 
that took up the “challenge” of transformation were left on their own to apply various (though 
admittedly significant) elements of theoretical and practical achievements of market economies 
(especially the highly developed ones) on the one hand and on the other hand – to invent their 
                                               
1 Paper presented at VIII Ogólnopolski Zjazd Katedr Ekonomii. Ekonomiczne wyzwania XXI wieku: Polska – 
Unia Europejska – Świat, 5-8.06.11, Międzyzdroje. Published in: Selected Problems of Market Economy in the 
Crisis Era, ed. D. Kopycińska, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Szczecin 2011, pp. 9-24. 
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own, often pioneering, programmes and activities, taking into account diverse historical and 
contemporary conditions of their socio-economic situations. 
Therefore, when undertaking a closer (though still highly synthetic) analysis and evaluation of the 
economic transformation, taking into accout particularly the experiences and achievements of a 
selected (but also especially compact and representative) group of transitional economies, we 
concentrate on three areas in particular: the initial conditions, the progress and the results. At the 
same time, the fundamental hypothesis of this study is that from the beginning of the systemic 
changes in the transitional economies there was a strong correlation between the actual changes 
and the scale and intensity of changes in the economy. Moreover, the economic policy of the state 
as well as the accompanying reorganisation of the institutional order contributed significantly to 
both achievements and failures of transformation.  
 
Initial conditions  
Although similar in many respects, the transitional economies were – and still are – significantly 
different with respect to political, economic, social and cultural acpects (Kozarzewski, 2006, p. 
37; Fischer, Sahay, 2000, p. 35). The differences had an impact on the progress and the results of 
the transformation2.  
Therefore, this study first analyses selected political, social and economic aspects of the 
functioning of 13 transitional countires (TC-13) in the year preceding the transformation (t-1). The 
countries have been selected according to their affiliation to particular regions (the initial year of 
the transformation is given in the brackets). The group consists of the following regions and 
countries:  
a) Central-Eastern Europe and Baltic states (CEE): the Czech Republic (1991), Estonia (1992), 
Lithuania (1992), Latvia (1992), Poland (1990), Slovakia (1991), Hungary (1990);  
b) South-East Europe (SEE): Albania (1991), Bulgaria (1991), Croatia (1990), Macedonia (1990), 
Romania (1991), Slovenia (1990)3.  
The common features distinguishing all the 13 countries are in particular: the previous economic 
system (centrally governed), being the effect of the long years of the communist rule (45 years on 
average – see table 5 in the annex), which led to economic crisis in all of the countries. The 
nationalisation of property contributed to the formation of the state monopoly in the 
overwhelming majority of economic sectors. The functioning of the system led also to the control 
regulation of most goods and services, in particular: commodities, means of production, financial 
assests and other. Citizens’ initiatives were subject to strict control of the state authorities and the 
censored media were used not only for information but also for propaganda. The extended system 
of order and distribution was accompanied with a kind of welfare state attempting to provide – by 
means of budgetary transfers – “socialist” equality with respect to education, culture, health 
services, social benefits, etc. Also state businesses were to provide social security to people 
(Tomidajewicz, 2009, p. 33-34), as one of their purposes was to permanently reduce the economic 
threats that could affect the employees. The system led to a noticeable growth of the socio-
economic gap between the analysed transitional countries (TC-13) and developed market 
economies.  
Furthermore, the analysed countries were characterised by similar parameters describing the 
political institutions operating in them. As a result, the level of political freedom in 1989 – 
measured with the Freedom in the World index – indicated that Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and other Baltic states were countries with practically no freedom (see 
table 5 in the annex). Only the societies of Croatia, Macedonia, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary 
were partially free. This relative political freedom in these countries made it possible for them to 
                                               
2 The initial conditons are one of the significant causative factors of transformation, next to the Policy of the 
state, the external influences and the accompanying processes. Taken together, they create the so-called 
inconsistency of the causative factors of the transformation. More: (Bałtowski, Miszewski, 2006, p. 97–99). 
3
 The analysis does not take into account Russia and former Soviet republics (except for the Baltic states), 
countries embroiled in war: Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia and later separated Montenegro and Kosovo. 
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outpace the other transitional countries with respect to the initial state of institutional reforms that 
preceded the systemic transformation.  
One of the fundamental differences between the analysed countries was their demographic 
potential. In the last year before the transformation the population of the analysed countries was 
116 million, 33% of which were the citizens of Poland (see table 5 in the annex) and 20% – the 
inhabitants of Romania. Also Hungary and the Czech Republic had relatively numerous 
populations (more than 10 million). Bulgaria was a medium-sized country, whereas the other 8 
countries were inhabited by the total number of about 25.4 million people, which constituted 
21.9% of the population of all the analysed countries. The country with the smaller number of 
citizens was Estonia, with the population on 1.58 million (Piotrowska, 2006, p. 21-37).  
At the “initial” point of the transformation the general level of economic development measured 
with the GDP per capita index was different for particular countries. In order to illustrate the 
differences in the level of economic activity in all of the countries, let us use the data from 1989, 
when some of the countries, particularly the so-called “early reformers” (Croatia, Czekoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slevenia) were already implementing their attempts at reforms, whereas the 
Baltic states were to operate for at least two more years within the social, political and economic 
structures of the USSR. The data on the GDP level per capita in the transitional economies shown 
by the purchasing power capacity (PPP) of American dollar are presented in table 5. As the data 
indicate, the level of GDP per capita in 1989 is characterised by significant discrepancies between 
particular countries, as the group of transitional countries consists of both countries whose level of 
GDP per capita by PPP equalled 2,833 dollars (Albania) and those in the case of which it 
amounted to more than 11.5 thousand dollars (Slovenia, the Czech Republic). Poland, Romania 
and Macedonia were characterised by lower than average values of GDP per capita.  
The diversified production levels in 1989 was the effect developmental differences between the 
economies of the analysed countries, as well as the economic crisis that took place before the start 
of transitional programmes. In the year preceding the start of the transformation, particular 
countries recorded not only the diversified levels of production but also the dynamics of the social 
product. Apart from Macedonia, Hungary and Poland, the transitional countries were all affected 
by recession, though of different intensity. The strongest was the recession in the Baltic states, 
Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The dynamics of GDP in the analysed transitional economies 
was shown in table 5 in the annex.  
Essential differences between TC-13 countries manifest themselves also in the remains of the 
former market system, especially as far as the share of the private sector in the economy is 
concerned. According to the estimates of EBRD, the share of the private sector oscillated between 
5% in Albania and 25-30% in Hungary and Poland respectively (Transition Report 1999. Ten 
Years of Transition, 1999, p. 184, 228, 252). The aversion to the capitalist ownership of means of 
production, characteristic for socialist economies, manifested itself strongly in the Baltic states 
and the former Czechoslovakia. With this respect, the situation in Hungary and Poland was 
special, as the private sectors in these two countries were relatively the largest. The private sector 
in Poland was constituted by individual farming and small manufacturing, mostly craft. In 
Hungary, the private sector was developed as a result of – among others – the reforms of 1956.  
Yet another difference between the analysed countries lied in the level of sustainability of 
economies, which in turn caused different levels of inflationary pressure, more or less suppressed 
by the authorities (Balcerowicz, Gelb, 1995, p. 8) (see table 5 in the annex). In the region of CEE 
countries, relatively sustained were only the economies of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where 
the rationing of goods was not excessive. Hence, these two countires recorded relatively low 
inflation level. The hyperinflationary growth of the average level of prices took place in the 
countries of former Jugoslavia, in Poland and in the Baltic states.  
The phenomenon of unemployment was formally absent from the centrally governed economies, 
because work – just as all other goods – was “scarce”. In reality, however, there was hidden 
unemployment – not included in the official statistics (Balcerowicz, Gelb, 1995, p. 31). Due to 
this approach to unemployment, most of the countries were characterised by the zero or close to 
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zero value of the “official unemployment rate”4. In some countries statistics revealed data on the 
under-utilisation of the work factor even before the start of the transitional programmes. These 
were the countries of former Jugoslavia and Albania.  
As a result of nationalisation the transitional countires had developed public sectors, which in turn 
led to high budgetary spending and in consequence – problems with achieving budgetary balance. 
In the region of Central Europe, only smaller countires, i.e., Slovenia and Estonia, recorded 
budgetary surplus. Few countries, among them Hungary, Moldavia and the Czech Republic, 
managed to maintain budgetary balance. The rest of the countries recorded deficits, in some cases 
were relatively high in relation to the GDP, for instance: 11.9% in Slovakia, 8.1% in Bulgaria, 
7.4% in Poland. The data concerning the budgetary results of particular countries and the 
budgetary redistribution are shown in table 5 in the annex.  
The transitional countries differed also with respect to the current account balance and the size of 
the foreign debt in relation to the GDP (see table 5 in the annex). The high foreign trade deficit, 
amounting to 29.1% in relation to the GDP was recorded by Albania. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum was Latvia, whose foreign trade surplus exceeded 17% in relation to the GDP. As for 
the foreign debt, the infamous leader of the ranking remained Slovenia, with the external 
indebtedness level amounting to 186.9% in relation to the GDP. Relatively highly indebted were 
also such countires as: Albania (66.0%), Hungary (65.8%), Poland (49.3%), Bulgaria (48.2%) and 
Latvia (36.8%).  
At the beginning of the transformation, the level of infrastructure necessary for the proper 
functioning of the societies and economies in the countries that undertook the transition was 
relatively low. Deficiencies were particularly visible in the area of technological infrastructure, 
especially in the fields of telecommunication and transport. A good example of the infrastructural 
backwardness was the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. While none of the countries 
exceeded the number of 25 telephone lines per 100 inhabtants, the countries varied significantly 
with this respect, with the record discrimination of the people of Albania5, where there were only 
1.2 telephones per 100 inhabitants. In the region of the CEE countries, the infrastructural 
backwardness of Poland was the most significant. The best developed infrastructure was in the 
Baltic states and the former Jugoslavia and Bulgaria.  
The descriptive characteristics of individual transitional countries presented above are obviously 
insufficient to clearly and comprehensively evaluate the differences between the analysed 
countries as regards the initial level of their preparedness to the systemic change. Therefore, in 
order to more specifically estimate the position of particular countries (and particular countries 
against the background of distinguished regions), let us use ranking and cluster analysis6. The 
general conclusion that can be drawn from the results of the ranking is that, against the 
background of all the analysed 13 countries, the countries of South-Eastern Europe (except for 
Slovenia) had relatively worse initial conditions for transformation. Better initial conditions were 
characteristic for the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, with the Czech Republic as the leader 
in the area and Poland with relatively the worst starting position. 
The results of cluster analysis taking into account such criteria as: the GDP dynamics, the 
inflation rate, the unemployment rate, the budgetary balance and the current account in relation to 
the GDP are shown in Figure 1. The dendrogram data confirm the previously drawn conclusions. 
The particular countries were characterised by quite significant relative diversification of the 
initial conditions for reforms, which allows us to discriminate five clusters of countries: two 
Baltic states (Estonia and Latvia), the countries that emerged from the disintegration of the former 
Jugoslavia (Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, the latter falling behind the resto of the countries), 
                                               
4 We must remember that official data did not include work trias abroad. 
5 According to the EBRD data: www.ebrd.com, DOA 25.01.2011. 
6 The description of methods of multi-dimensional grouping, also known as the cluster analysis can be found in, 
for example: (Poczta-Wajda, 2010, p. 77-82). For the purpose of this study, we adopted the Ward method and the 
Euclidean distance. 
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the countries of the best initial conditions – the Czech Republic and Hungary, five countries of the 
Central Europe (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), and Albania. 
 
Figure 1. Cluster analysis dendrogram for TC-13  
Source: own study.  
 
The progress of transformation  
 
Transitional recession 
 
The transition from the centrally governed economy to the market economy was accompanied 
with great expectations concerning the improvement of the living conditions. The societies of 
transitional countries expected that they would quickly achieve the level of prosperity 
characteristic for developed countries. The high hopes were the result of the belief that the 
exchange of the wasteful system of the centrally governed economy for an economically efficient 
market economy must lead to the increase in production and welfare. 
Bearing in mind the findings concerning the initial conditions in the transitional countries, let us 
now consider the progress of the transformation itself and its results, analysing and evaluating the 
13 transitional countries in the period of 1989-2009. The transformation in these countries started 
in 1990 (5 states), in 1991 (5 states) and in 1992 also in the former countries of the USSR (3 
states). In the first period of the transformation all of these countries experienced deep recession 
(the transitional recession). The production of the countries decreased regardless of both the 
economic conditions prevailing at the moment when the transformation started and the method of 
transition into the market economy itself7.  
Figure 2 shows the changes in the size of production in the transitioning countries by groups. 
Compering the experience of the countries of Central-Eastern Europe and the Baltic states and the 
                                               
7
 As for the persistence and debt of the transitional recession, it has been indicated that the official statistical data 
seriously overestimate the depth of the transitional recession (Bartholdy, 1997, p. 131; Berg, 1993, p. 40-41). 
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countries of South-Eastern Europe in the 90s, we can clearly see a significantly lower pace of 
economic growth in the other group. Whereas the curve depicting the changes in production in 
Central-Eastern Europe and in the Baltic states looks like a letter “J” in the diagram (which means 
several years of recession followed by the return of the economic growth and, as a result, the 
increase in the production level exceeding the one recorded in 1989), the shape of the curve for 
the countries of South-Eastern Europe is irregular, which indicates longer recession also followed 
by the increase in production but at a much slower pace. 
 
Figure 2. Changes in the GDP values in TC-13 (1989=100)  
Source: “Transition report 1997”, EBRD, London 1997; “Transition report 2000”, EBRD, London 2000; 
“Transition report 2007”, EBRD, London 2007. 
 
Taking 1989 as the base year we can see that the recession was the least severe in the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary (where the production did not fall beneath 80% of the 
production level in 1989; see table 6 in the annex). The countries most affected by the recession 
were: Bulgaria (where the recession lasted particularly long – 7 years), Croatia, Lithuania and 
Latvia (where at its lowest point, the production did not exceed 60% of the one in the base year). 
Moreover, whereas the countries of Central-Eastern Europe and the Baltic states “returned” to the 
growth path, the experiences of the countries of South-Eastern Europe were different. After the 
period of the transitional recession the production grew, but it grew slower than in CEE or even 
suffered more temporal decreases (as in, for instance, Bulgaria or Romania).  
The above data confirm that the transitional recession was a common experience of all the 
countries going through the transformation. Neither relatively good economic conditions at the 
start of the transition nor a particular transitional strategy could save any of the countries from the 
recession, although the conditions had an impact on its persistence and depth. The most important 
causes of recession, most often mentioned in the relevant literature, were: the restrictive 
macroeconomic policy (Balicki, 1994), the collapse of the COMECON (Gács, 1995; Rodrik, 
1993), the backwardness of the financial sector (Campos, Coricelli, 2002; Calvo, Coricelli, 1993), 
the transition from the seller’s market to the buyer’s market (Winiecki 1991; Berg, 1994), the 
transformation of the structure of the economy (Fardmanesh, Tan, 2005; Hernández-Cata, 1997), 
the problems with the coordination of economic activities (Kornai, 1994; Blanchard, Kremer 
1997; Blanchard 1996, 1997).  
The example of Czechoslovakia (i.e., the country from 1990 to 1992 that existed under the name 
of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) indicates the importance of the structure of the 
economy for the depth of the transitional recession. Before the state dissolved in 1993, the same 
transitional strategy had been implemented in both its parts, but its negative results were initially 
much greater in the case of Slovakia. One of the reasons behind it was the fact that the Slovakian 
economy was dominated by heavy industry – much more difficult to restructure, of smaller 
potential and significantly technologically backward – and that it delivered less processed 
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products, and was highly dependant on foreign partners (Gurbiel, 2001, p. 12). Other political 
factors that influenced the length of the transitional recession were political instability and ethnic 
conflicts. Such were the experiences of the countries that emerged after the collapse of the USSR 
and Jugoslavia (de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, Tenev, 1997; Popov, 2000; Staehr, 2003).  
In the analysed period all the countries exceeded the GDP level from the year preceding the start 
of the economic transition. This was first achieved in Poland (5 years), then in Slovakia and 
Slovenia (7 years) and Albania and Estonia (8 years), as a result of the implementation of the 
transitional programmes. The most difficult was the situation in Bulgaria and Macedonia where 
only in 2008 the production achieved the level from before the transformation, but as a result of 
recession the level of production in Bulgaria in 2009 reached only 97.8% of the GDP level from 
the year before the start of the transformation (see table 6).  
The average pace of the changes in the GDP after achieving the minimum GDP level in the 
analysed countries oscillated between 6.3% in Albania and 2.6% in Macedonia. High average 
annual growth rate (exceeding 4%) was recorded also in the Baltic states, in Bulgaria, Poland and 
Slovakia. At the same time, the countries that were more developed at the begining of the 
transformation, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, had a lower production growth rate 
(2.8% average annual; see table 6).  
 
Programmes of macroeconomic stabilisation  
 
All of the analysed transitial countries introduced stabilisational programmes at the very 
beginning of the transformation (colums 2 in tables 6 and 7). The main aim of the stabilisation of 
the economy was first of all to reduce the inflation and the budget deficit. A year before the 
implementation of the stabilisation programmes most of the economies struggled with very high 
inflation, which in most of the countries – with the exception of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary – was actuallty two- or three-digit hyperinflation.  
The sources of the inflation included first of all the excess demand (the inflation bias) and the 
increase in costs stemming from the rapid wage growth, as well as the inefficient activities of 
enterprises (Matkowski, 2003, p. 751). The governments of the countries applied various 
instruments to combat inflation (the realignment of the money supply, restrictive monetary 
policies, a nominal anchor in the form of the fixed exchange rate). More generally, we can say 
that the struggle against inflation in the transitional countries ended in a success. Assuming that 
the stabilisation of inflation can be indicated by, for example, its permanent drop beneath the level 
of 40%, it can be concluded that all of the analysed countries met this condition (see Figure 3). 
Moreover, in most of the countires the goal was achieved within the period of 1-3 years. The 
process lasted the longest in Romania (8 years). In 2008 the highest inflation rate was recorded in 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Bulgaria (about 10%). 
 
Figure 3. Inflation level (logarithmic scale) by groups  
Source: own study based on the data of: IMF Economic Outlook Database, April 2010. Note: S – refers to the 
year preceding the implementation of the stablilisation programme in a given country.  
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Another significant goal of the stabilisation programme was to balance the public finances, 
including the reduction of the budgetary deficit, which clearly grew at the beginning of the 
transformation (as a result of the transitional recession, but also due to the lack or slow changes in 
the structure of budgetary expenditures), while increasing the social spending (see Figure 4.). The 
high budgetary deficit could contribute to growing inflationary pressure (Fischer, Sahay, Végh, 
1996, p. 231). 
 
Figure 4. State budget balance in relation to the GDP of the countries by groups (in %)  
Source: own study based on: (Transition Report 2009, 2009; Transition Report 2000, 2000).  
Note: S – refers to the year in which the stabilisation programmes were implemented in given countries. 
 
Liberalisation and privatisation 
 
As we know, the transitional countries also started intensive reforms aimed at the deregulation of 
enterprises’ operations, price liberalisation, the liberalisation in the foreign trade and in the bank 
sector. As for the liberalisation of forein exchange and foreign trade the countries relatively 
quickly achieved results characteristic for market economies. This concerned especially the 
countries negotiating the accession to the European Communities, because these changes were 
perceived as a clear criterion the meeting of which confirmed the maturity of the countries’ 
economies as “market-oriented” and as such – “worth” the accession to the EU (see table 1). 
Table 1. EBRD index of enterprises reforms and price liberalization 
Country Index of enterprises reforms Index of price liberalisation 
t t+5 2009 t t+5 2009 
Albania  1,0 2,0 2,3 1,0 3,7 4,3 
Bulgaria  1,0 2,0 2,7 4,3 2,7 4,3 
Croatia  1,0 2,0 3,0 3,7 4,0 4,0 
Czech 
Republic  
2,0 3,0 3,3* 3,0 4,3 4,3* 
Estonia  2,0 3,0 3,7 2,7 4,3 4,3 
Lithuania  1,0 2,7 3,0 2,7 4,0 4,3 
Latvia  2,0 2,7 3,0 4,0 4,3 4,3 
Macedonia  1,0 2,0 2,7 3,7 4,0 4,3 
Poland  2,0 3,0 3,7 3,7 4,0 4,3 
Romania  1,0 2,0 2,7 2,7 4,0 4,3 
Slovakia  2,0 3,0 3,7 4,0 4,0 4,3 
Slovenia  1,0 2,7 3,0 3,7 3,7 4,0 
Hungary  1,0 3,0 3,7 4,0 4,3 4,3 
Source: own study based on: Transition Report 1999, op.cit., Transition Report 2003, op.cit., Transition Report 
2009, op.cit. Note: t – the initial year of the economic transformation; * available data up to 2007, because the 
Czech Republic was excluded from the Transition Report as the country where the transformation has 
completed. 
 
Also, in all the transitional countries the privatisation processes started almost immediately or 
with little delay. The privatisation was mostly mass (general) or mixed, with the use of various 
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techniques (manager and/or employee buyouts, vouchers, direct sales). Studies (J. Bennett’a et al., 
2007) show that it was the mass privatisation that had the greatest significance for the economic 
growth.  
Tables 2 and 3 show the characteristics of privatisation processes in the transitional countries. 
Table 2. Privatisation processes 
Country Privatisation Share of the private sector in the GDP (%)  
 
Year* Main techniques 1990 1995 2000 2008 
Albania  1995 MEBO, voucher 5 60 75 75 
Bulgaria  1993 direct sale, voucher 10 45 70 75 
Croatia  1992 MEBO, voucher 15 40 60 70 
Czech Republic  1992 voucher, direct sale 10 70 80 80* 
Estonia  1993 direct sale, voucher 10 65 75 80 
Lithuania  1991 voucher, direct sale 10 65 70 75 
Latvia  1992 direct sale, voucher 10 55 65 70 
Macedonia  1993 MEBO, voucher 15 40 55 70 
Poland  1990 direct sale, MEBO 30 60 70 75 
Romania  1992 MEBO, direct sale 15 40 60 70 
Slovakia  1995 direct sale, voucher 10 60 80 80 
Slovenia  1998 MEBO, voucher 15 45 65 70 
Hungary  1990 direct sale, MEBO 25 60 80 80 
Source: as with table 1. Note: MEBO – management/employee buy-out; * available data up to 2007. 
 
Table 3. EBRD large- and small-scale privatisation indexes 
Country Large-scale privatisation  
 
Small-scale privatisation  
 
t t+5 2009 t t+5 2009 
Albania  1,0 2,0 3,7 2,0 4,0 4,0 
Bulgaria  1,0 2,0 4,0 1,0 3,0 4,0 
Croatia  1,0 2,0 3,3 3,0 4,0 4,3 
Czech 
Republic  1,0 4,0 4,3 3,0 4,0 4,3 
Estonia  1,0 4,0 4,0 2,0 4,3 4,3 
Lithuania  2,0 3,0 4,0 2,7 4,0 4,3 
Latvia  2,0 3,0 3,7 2,0 4,0 4,3 
Macedonia  1,0 2,0 3,3 3,0 4,0 4,0 
Poland  2,0 3,0 3,3 3,0 4,0 4,3 
Romania  1,7 2,0 3,7 1,0 2,7 3,7 
Slovakia  1,0 3,0 4,0 3,0 4,0 4,3 
Slovenia  1,0 2,0 3,0 3,0 4,0 4,3 
Hungary  2,0 3,0 4,0 1,0 3,7 4,3 
Source: as with table 1.  
The maximum values are shown against the grey background. t – the year when the economic transformation 
started. 
 
As can be seen from the presented data, as a result of the applied privatisation techniques, but also 
as a result of the bottom-up privatisation, the contribution of the private sector to the GDP grew 
significantly. At the same time, the countries of Central-Eastern Europe and the Baltic states 
achieved “the greatest successes” with this respect, as the “small-scale privatisation” in these 
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countries has been definitely completed (with the index at the value equalling 4.3, i.e. at the level 
characteristic for countries of developed market economies), whereas the value of the “large-scale 
privatization” index equals 3.8 on average. The private sector produces more than 77% of the 
GDP. At the same time, the countries of South-Eastern Europe achieved worse results, with the 
“small-scale privatisation” index at the average level of 4 and the “large-scale privatisation” index 
– at 3.6. The private sector produces on average 72% of the GDP. 
 
Conclusions  
 
Table 4 includes data depicting the changes in the develpmental level of the transitional countries. 
Table 4. Chnages of the relative developmental level in the transitional countries 
Countries GDP 
1989 2009E 
USD, p.c., 
PPP 
average for the 
whole group  
 = 100 
USD, p.c., 
PPP 
average for the 
whole group  
 = 100 
Central-Eastern Europe, including Baltic states 
Czech Republic 11626 145 24271 146 
Estonia 8635 108 17695 107 
Lithuania 8867 110 16529 100 
Latvia 8383 104 14291 86 
Poland 6113 76 18050 109 
Slovakia 9432 118 21245 128 
Hungary 8739 109 18506 111 
Average 8828 110 18655 112 
South-Eastern Europe 
Albania 2833 35 7169 43 
Bulgaria 7330 91 11883 72 
Croatia 8127 101 17707 107 
Macedonia 6553 82 9183 55 
Romania 5814 72 11869 71 
Slovenia 11868 148 27470 165 
Average 7088 88 14214 86 
Total 8025 100 16605 100 
E – forecasts.  
Source: own calculations based on the World Economic Outlook. Database, IMF, September 2005; World 
Economic Outlook. Database, IMF, October 2010. 
 
Basing on the data presented above we can point out the following, more general phenomena that 
took place in the group of transitional countries. There was a significant spread of incomes in the 
whole group; in 2009 the relation between the values of the GDP per capita by the purchasing 
power parity in the richest (Slovenia) and the poorest country (Albania) was 3.8:1. Moreover, one 
could observe the increase in the developmental gap between the countries of Central-Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic states and the countries of South-Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the 
developmental position of some of the countries from the group improved significantly (especially 
in the case of Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). 
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Statistical annex 
Table 5. Characteristics of selected initial conditions in TC-13 
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(% 
total)  
Albania  1991 45 7 7 NF 3,3 2,8 2833 -10,0 0,0 9,5 -6,1 -29,1 66,0 5,0 13 
Bulgaria  1991 43 7 7 NF 8,7 7,5 7330 -9,1 26,3 1,6 -8,1 -8,2 48,2 10,0 12 
Croatia  1990 44 5 5 PF 4,8 4,1 8127 -1,6 609,5 9,3 -4,2 -3,8 17,9 15,0 11 
Czech 
Republic  
1991 43 6 6 NF 10,3 8,9 11626 -1,2 9,7 0,7 -0,2 1,3 17,1 10,0 1 
Estonia  1992 51 6 5 NF 1,6 1,4 8635 -13,6 210,5 1,5 1,2 3,3 5,7 10,0 3 
Lithuania  1992 51 6 5 NF 3,7 3,2 8867 -5,7 224,7 0,3 -5,5 -3,4 12,4 10,0 6 
Latvia  1992 51 6 5 NF 2,7 2,3 8383 -10,4 172,2 0,6 -3,9 17,3 36,8 10,0 7 
Macedonia  1990 44 5 5 PF 2,1 1,8 6553 0,9 1246,0 18,0 -4,5 -9,2 14,8 15,0 10 
Poland  1990 42 5 5 PF 38,0 32,7 6113 0,2 251,1 0,3 -7,4 -2,2 49,3 30,0 9 
Romania  1991 43 7 7 NF 23,2 20,0 5814 -5,7 5,1 0,0 -4,6 -9,6 16,5 15,0 8 
Slovakia  1991 43 6 6 NF 5,3 4,6 9432 -0,4 10,8 1,2 -11,9 -4,5 13,0 10,0 4 
Slovenia  1990 44 5 5 PF 2,0 1,7 11868 -1,8 1285,3 7,3 2,6 7,1 186,9 15,0 5 
Hungary  1990 41 5 4 PF 10,4 9,0 8739 0,7 17,0 0,5 0,0 -4,6 65,8 25,0 2 
Note: PR – political rights, CL – civil liberties; NF – no freedom, PF – partially free.  
Source: EBRD data: www.ebrd.com, Freedom House: www.freedomhouse.org and own calculations. 
 14 
Table 6. GDP changes in 1989-2009 
Country  Initial year of 
the 
transformatio
n  
Year when 
GDP was the 
lowest since 
beginning of 
transformation  
Transitional 
recession 
duration  
The lowest 
GDP  
GDP after 10 
years  
GDP in 
2009E  
Year after 
exceeding the 
initial year level  
Year of the 
GDP maximum  
Average GDP chan 
ges pace after 
reaching the 
minimum (%)  
The year before the transformation in the country 
is the base year = 100  
 
Albania  1991 1992 2 66,8 122,8 188,0 1999 2009 6,3 
Bulgaria  1991 1997 7 59,3 69,2 97,8 2008 2008 4,3 
Croatia  1990 1993 4 59,5 78,8 104,7 2006 2008 3,6 
Czech Republic  1991 1992 2 85,6 104,3 136,2 2000 2008 2,8 
Estonia  1992 1994 3 76,8 125,8 153,4 2000 2007 4,7 
Lithuania  1992 1994 3 59,5 85,7 113,4 2004 2008 4,4 
Latvia  1992 1993 2 57,7 86,2 107,7 2004 2007 4,1 
Macedonia  1990 1995 6 70,3 81,3 100,2 2008 2008 2,6 
Poland  1990 1991 2 86,3 134,3 189,4 1995 2009 4,5 
Romania  1991 1992 2 79,4 89,8 128,2 2004 2008 2,9 
Slovakia  1991 1993 3 76,9 107,7 160,5 1998 2008 4,7 
Slovenia  1990 1992 3 82,0 114,5 147,9 1997 2008 3,5 
Hungary  1990 1993 4 81,9 104,8 136,3 2000 2008 2,8 
Note: E – forecast from the World Economic Outlook Database October 2010, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/index.aspx (DOA: 7.02.2011).  
Source: own study based on: Transition Report 1999. Ten Years of Transition, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London 1999; World Economic Outlook 
Database October 2010, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/index.aspx (DOA: 7.02.2011). 
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Table 7. Stabilisation programmes (1989-2009) 
Country  Date of the 
implementation of 
the stabilisation 
programme  
Inflation one year 
before the 
implementation 
(%)  
Maximum 
inflation  
Minimum inflation  Year when 
inflation 
permanently 
dropped below 
40%  
Inflation after 5 
years of 
programme (%)  
Inflation 
after 2009 
(%)  
Foreign exchange rate 
system adopted at the 
start of stabilisation  
Level (%)  Year  Level 
(%)  
Year  
Albania  08.1992 35,7 226,0 1992 0,0 2000 1994 33,2 2,2 floating  
Bulgaria  02.1991 23,9 1061,2 1997 2,6 1999 1998 123,0 2,5 floating  
Croatia  10.1993 665,5 1517,0 1993 1,7 2002 1995 5,7 2,4 fixed  
Czech Republic  01.1991 9,7 52,0 1991 0,1 2003 1992 8,8 1,0 fixed  
Estonia  06.1992 210,5 1076,0 1992 1,3 2003 1995 11,2 -0,1 fixed  
Lithuania  06.1992 224,7 1020,5 1992 -1,1 2003 1995 10,3 4,2 floating/ fixed*  
Latvia  06.1992 172,2 951,2 1992 2,0 2002 1994 8,1 3,3E floating/ fixed**  
Macedonia  01.1994 338,7 1620,4 1992 -0,4 2004 1995 -0,3 -0,8 fixed  
Poland  01.1990 251,1 585,8 1990 0,8 2003 1993 27,9 3,5 fixed  
Romania  10.1993 210,4 256,1 1993 4,8 2007 2001 59,1 5,6 floating  
Slovakia  01.1991 10,8 61,2 1991 1,9 2007 1992 5,8 0,9 fixed  
Slovenia  02.1992 115,0 1285,3 1989 2,5 2006 1993 8,4 0,9 floating  
Hungary  03.1990 17,0 34,2 1991 3,6 2005 whole period 28,3 4,2 fixed  
Note: * in April 1994 the currency board system was introduced; ** SDR-linked currency in February 1994; E – forecast from World Economic Outlook Database October 
2010, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/index.aspx (DOA: 7.02.2011). Source: own study based on: Transition report 1999, op.cit. (the date of 
the introduction of the stabilisation programme; data for the period 1989-1992); World Economic Outlook Database April 2010 Edition, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/index.aspx (DOA: 7.02.2011). 
 
 
